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An enigmatic discussion in Newton’s unpublished tract, De Gravitatione, on the immobility of the parts of space has brought about much discussion, and many recent reappraisals, among philosophers of space and time. Besides the contributions of McGuire, DiSalle, Maudlin, Healey, Torretti, and others on this topic, there have appeared two important assessments by Nerlich and Huggett which more directly examine Newton’s specific arguments. In short, does Newton’s pronouncements on the parts of space, which seems to base their identity on their structural interrelationships, undermine his alleged substantivalism (i.e., that space is an independently existing entity of some sort), since all the parts in infinite Euclidean space bear the same structural relationships with one another? In order to better grasp the possible intentions underlying Newton’s treatment of these issues, this paper will explore the background and possible sources of influence on Newton’s theory, as well as critique the interpretations and arguments advanced by these commentators with respect to both Newton’s hypotheses and modern spacetime debates. In conclusion, the analysis put forward thus far will be shown to be deficient in various respects, such that Newton’s conception of space either avoids the problems that they have raised, fails to acknowledge key components in Newton’s overall ontology and methodology of space, or provides the wrong analogue as regards modern spacetime theories.
Section 1 will explore the details of Newton’s “immobility arguments”, as they will be dubbed, as well as the formulations of these arguments provided by Nerlich and Huggett. The historical context in which Newton’s arguments were developed will form a large portion of the remainder of this essay, with the crucial role of the “simplicity” of space, i.e., the notion of physical indivisibility, examined in section 2. The interplay of metrical and topological notions in Newton’s geometrical conception of the points and parts of space, and a discussion of the “holistic” nature of the metric, as advocated by Nerlich and Healey, will also be investigated in section 2. While the holistic conception will gain a good measure of historical support, the underlying ontological foundations of space, i.e., God’s omnipresence, will also be shown to comprise a crucial feature of Newton’s spatial theory. In section 3, these ontological implications for contemporary structuralist interpretations of spacetime will be examined, alongside the applicability of active and passive transformations and the problem of Leibniz shift arguments in Huggett’s reappraisal of the immobility arguments.

1. Newton’s Immobility Arguments             
1.1 Contemporary Analysis. In Newton’s De Gravitatione, an important tract from (probably) the early 1680s, an argument for the immobility of space is presented which has spawned much debate among Newton commentators and philosophers of space and time. Following Huggett’s important contribution to these issues (2008, 2), the apparent change of emphasis in this passage, will be labeled (Ai) and (Aii) respectively:  
[(Ai)] The parts of space are motionless. If they moved, it would have to be said either that the motion of each part is a translation from the vicinity of other contiguous parts, as Descartes defined the motion of bodies, and it has been sufficiently demonstrated that this is absurd; or that it is a translation out of space into space, that is out of itself, unless perhaps it is said that two spaces everywhere coincide, a moving one and a motionless one. [(Aii)] Moreover, the immobility of space will be best exemplified by duration. For just as the parts of duration are individuated by their order, so that (for example) if yesterday could change places with today and become the later of the two, it would lose its individuality and would no longer be yesterday, but today; so the parts of space are individuated by their positions (positiones), so that if any two could change their positions, they would change their individuality at the same time and each would be converted numerically (numerice) into the other. The parts of duration and space are understood to be the same as they really are only because of their mutual order and position (ordinem et positiones inter se partes); nor do they have any principle of individuation apart from that order and position, which consequently cannot be altered. (2004, 25)

A line of argument similar to (Ai) also turns up in the scholium on space and time in the first edition of the Principia (1687), a passage which we will identify as (B). 
[(B)] Just as the order of the parts of time is unchangeable, so, too, is the order
of the parts of space. Let the parts of space move from their places, and they
will move (so to speak) from themselves. For times and spaces are, as it were,
the places of themselves and of all things. All things are placed in time with
reference to order of succession and in space with reference to order of situation (situs). It is of the essence of spaces to be places, and for primary places to move is
absurd. They are therefore absolute places, and it is only changes of position (translationes) from these places that are absolute motions. (2004, 66)

In brief: (Ai) and (B) argue that the parts of space cannot move since that would entail that a part could move “out of itself”, (Ai), or parts could move “from themselves”, (B), which is presumably a contradiction: i.e., nothing can move out of itself. (Aii)—the identity argument—claims that, since the parts of space are understood to be the same due to their “the mutual order and position”, and since any interchange of parts preserves the same mutual order, thus there can be no interchange of parts, and thus the parts did not really move/interchange.
As noted by Huggett, the (Aii) argument does not appear in (B); nevertheless, a remnant can still be traced: “All things are placed in time with reference to order of succession and in space with reference to order of situation”. We will return to (Ai) and (B) in section 2, but a more in-depth examination of the identity argument is in order given the looming contradictions for the concept of absolute (or substantival) space allegedly inherent in Newton’s claims.
1.2: The Problem with the Identity Argument. As Huggett succinctly puts it, “if any two parts of space are indistinguishable with respect to their metrical relations, then they are strictly identical” (2008, 6). In order to reach this conclusion, therefore, something like Leibniz’ “principle of the identity of the indiscernibles”, PII, must be in play: if two objects, things, substances, etc., have the same properties (such that none has a different property than the other), then they are identical (i.e., they are the same object). In what follows, S will stand for the instantaneous specification of the metrical relations of the points of space, with p and q representing points or parts of space.
1) Consider any two states, S1 and S2, such that in S2 a point q has all metrical properties that a point p has in S1. Then by the PII, q = p (i.e., q “would be converted numerically into” p). Here, one could also replace worlds, W, for states of one world, S. 

2) Newton claims that points have no “principle of individuation apart from [their] position”, where Newton’s phrase is defined as the metrical relations between points.

3) The symmetries of (infinite) Euclidean space are such that every point has the same metrical relations to every other point.

4) Conclusion: The points of Newton’s (Euclidean) space are identical (i.e., they are the same point), which raises a contradiction for Newton’s conception of absolute (substantival) space, and also contradicts the standard interpretation of Euclidean geometry.

Nerlich gives a similar interpretation: “Every point in Euclidean space satisfies [Newton’s (Aii)]”; and “order and situation without some hint of individuality independent of that order is powerless to identify—to distinguish any point from any other” (2005, 123).
Needless to say, it is the symmetric and homogeneous nature of Newton’s Euclidean conception of space that generates the difficulty, although other symmetric spaces, such as spherical, would suffer the same fate given Newton’s identity argument (but not most variably curved and dynamical spaces; e.g., the pseudo-Riemannian spacetime manifold of General Relativity; see, section 3 below, and Wüthrich 2008, for a criticism of spacetime structuralism along the same lines as Nerlich’s against Newton). Huggett ultimately attempts to deny the necessity of PII, and thereby evade the unpalatable conclusion that all of the points in Newton’s absolute space are the very same point, by utilizing a form of de re representation of points across states or worlds (An examination of Huggett’s attempted solution is not the subject of this essay.) Yet, as will be argued, a more in-depth historical analysis of Newton’s conception of space, and the immobility arguments in general, can side step the problem raised above even if one grants the role of the PII in the identity argument.

2. The Background to Newton’s Immobility Arguments.
As is clear from the title of his article, “Can the Parts of Space Move?”, Nerlich sees the immobility arguments primarily as a metaphysical effort to counter that very possibility. Huggett understands these arguments in a similar fashion, eventually conceding, as regards (Ai), that “it is not clear how this argument secures Newton against the motion of the parts of space relative to one another. Why should we not define another sense of the motion of places, not as motion out of place, but a change of distance to other places”; and, with respect to (Aii): “although [A(ii)] does demonstrate the relative immobility of the parts of space, since Newton cannot consistently hold it [due to the identity argument], he has no demonstration at all” (2008, 4). But, are Newton’s immobility arguments really intended to preclude the motion of the parts of space? This section will strive to show that Newton actually had different objectives in mind; specifically, to refute the notion that space has real, divisible parts, as well as (at least potentially) to deny that space itself requires a space or place.
2.1. Oneness. One of the traditional difficulties with the concept of place in the Aristotelian/Scholastic philosophy is the potential infinite regress that ensues given the stipulation that all things (except God) require a place: Does place also need a place? And, if place needs a place, then the “place of place” would need a place, too, etc. These problems were well known by the late Medieval period, as is evident in the writings of Albert of Saxony and John Buridan (see, Grant 1981, 18). Aristotle’s finite conception of the universe could evade this particular worry, however, since his definition of place, as the boundary of the containing body, entailed that the universe as a whole did not have a place (due to the absence of a containing body). By the late seventeenth century, on the other hand, the regress argument would have acquired a new-found significance, since the Aristotelian/Scholastic definition of place had fallen out of favor among many natural philosophers, especially among the brand of atomist (Gassendian) and neo-Platonist conceptions of space prevalent in Newton’s day. Moreover, the belief that space was infinite in extent, i.e., without boundary, was nearly commonplace among these same natural philosophers. 
The Cambridge neo-Platonist, Henry More, may address the regress issue, albeit indirectly, in his Enchiridium Metaphysicum (1671), a work that almost certainly greatly influenced Newton’s De Grav.​[1]​ In making the case against the “discerpibility” of space, which refers to the physical divisibility of the parts of space, More contends that “if it were supposed that parts were discerped, they would be ipso facto moved in the same place and, so, the place in which they are moved would be more internal and deeper than that which we have hitherto needed” (1995, 60). Although it is difficult to track the exact rationale behind More’s claim that place would need to be “more internal and deeper” then “needed” if spatial parts were allowed to move, an awareness of the potential regress of place may be a factor. Indeed, More’s insistence that infinite spatial extension is “one” would seem to incorporate the same concerns about a multiplicity of places: “infinite extension distinct from matter . . .  is one to the extent that it is absolutely impossible that to that one there be many, or that it make many, since it has no physical parts from which they can be combined and into which they can be truly and physically divided, . . . “ (58). It is the “oneness” of space which most likely underlies Newton’s immobility arguments as well, since this would explain why Newton finds it equally contradictory for the parts of space to move. Like More, if a part of space could move, it would move “out of itself” in (Ai), and parts would move “from themselves” in (B), and these assertions, along with their intended contradictory implications, only make sense given the stipulation of space’s oneness.
2.2. Indiscerpibility and Simplicity. On More’s estimation, the oneness of space is inextricably linked with its “simplicity” (that space is without parts) and, of course, indiscerpibility (the denial of physical divisibility of space by a process of tearing or cutting). In chapter 8, section 9, of the Enchiridium, More draws together these three features of infinite spatial extension in order to describe an added characteristic, namely, immobility. He aims to relate “in what way that infinite immobile extension distinct from matter is one, simple, and immobile”, after which he defines oneness (see section 2.1) and simplicity: “[infinite extension] is aptly called simple, seeing that it has, as I have said, no physical parts” (58). More continues: 
And this simplicity, however, is easily understood of its immobility. For, no infinite extension which is not combined from parts, nor is condensed or thickened in some way, can be moved, either from part to part, since the whole is simple and indiscerpible, nor can the whole at the same time, since it is infinite, be contracted into less space, since it is not condensed anywhere nor can it leave its place, since this infinite is the intimate place of all things, within or beyond which there is nothing.” (More 1995, 58)

In short, the inability of the parts of space to move follows directly from the oneness, simplicity, and indiscerpibility of infinite extension.
That Newton’s immobility arguments, (Ai), (Aii), and (B), are predicated on a set of beliefs, similar to More’s, about the oneness, simplicity, and indiscerpibility of space is practically indisputable. In an unpublished tract from the early 1690s, entitled “Tempus et Locus” by McGuire (hereafter, TeL), Newton openly declares that “space itself has no parts which can be separated from one another, . . . . For it is a single being, most simple, and most perfect in its kind” (McGuire 1978b, 117). The likely motivation for both Newton and More’s views is the troubling prospect that discerpibility may be ascribed to both space and the ontological foundation of space, i.e., the omnipresent God. In the De Grav, Newton cautions that “lest anyone should . . . imagine God to be like a body, extended and made of divisible parts, it should be known that spaces themselves are not actually divisible . . . .” (2004, 26). By denying that space is comprised of separable parts, Newton thus blocks any maneuver, such as Leibniz’ insinuations in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (Leibniz and Clarke 2000, 45; L.V.42), that attribute parthood to God via spatial divisibility. Given the assistance that Newton likely rendered to Clarke, it is thus not surprising that many of the themes of oneness, simplicity, and indiscerpibility, both for space and God, figure prominently in Clarke’s detailed replies:
For infinite space is one, absolutely and essentially indivisible, and to suppose it parted is a contradiction in terms, because there must be space in the partition itself, which is to suppose it parted and yet not parted at the same time. The immensity or omnipresence of God is no more a dividing of his substance into parts than his duration or continuance of existing is a dividing of his existence into parts. (2000, 19; C.III.3)  

Parts in the corporeal sense of the word are separable, compounded, ununited, independent of, and movable from each other; but infinite space, though it may be partially apprehended by us, that is, may in our imagination be conceived as composed of parts, yet since those parts (improperly so called) are essentially [indiscerpible]​[2]​ and immovable from each other and not able to be parted without an express contradiction in terms . . . , space consequently is in itself essentially one, and absolutely indivisible (2000, 31; C.IV.11-12)

As regards Newton’s immobility arguments, Clarke’s contention that “there would be space in the partition” is the direct analogue of Newton’s earlier claims that a part of space would move “out of itself” in (Ai), and “from themselves” in (B). The contradiction that both More and Newton had tried to articulate is expressed more successfully by Clarke, however: since “there would be space in the partition”, this “is to suppose it parted and not yet parted”. This is a much better formulation than More’s reference to a “more internal and deeper [place] than that which we have hitherto needed”, or Newton’s assertion that spaces are the “places of themselves” in (B).
Consequently, it is important to bear in mind that the immobility arguments are not solely intended to establish a thesis prohibiting the motion of the parts of space: rather, their specific intention is to offer reasons for denying that the parts of space can be physically divided or separated from one another. The immobility of infinite space is secured, not by the immobility arguments per se, but by the oneness, simplicity, and indiscerpibility of space, with the immobility arguments offered as a grounds for establishing those latter properties.
2.3. Simplicity and the Structuralism. At this juncture in our historical examination of the immobility arguments, it is essential to assess the background to the identity argument, (Aii), for it is the origin of many current disputes concerning the part-whole relationship in Newton’s conception of space. The problem, to recap, is that if the identity of the parts of space is provided by their mutual metrical relationships, which roughly correlates with Newton’s order of position/situation of spatial parts/places (see section 1), then the parts are all strictly identical since their mutual metrical relationships are all identical.
One route out of this difficulty is to embrace a form of spatial structuralism, such that the parts of space are no longer viewed as the elements that directly form or construct the whole of space. Rather, the dependence relationship goes in the other direction, with the whole of space comprising the basic ontological entity, and the parts/points as (somehow) derived from, or supervening on, the larger structure. Nerlich, drawing on Healey 1995, ultimately favors this interpretations of Newton’s spatial theory:
Something must be a structure-instantiating entity somewhere for realism to survive. But the parts of space need not play that role. Assume that space is real, but it is not made up of its parts, nor yet analyzable into parts with any kind of ontic independence. Perhaps, even, that spatial parts and their relations are, ontologically, supervenient on the structure of space. (Nerlich 2005, 131, original emphasis)
 
On this model, since infinite (Euclidean) space is, itself, the “structure-instantiating entity”, the fact that all of the parts of space bear the same metrical relationships with one another fails to undermine the coherence or consistency of Newton’s theory. That is, since the order of position (metric) is not grounded on a notion of ontologically independent spatial parts, where these parts are conceived as the foundational elements of the whole of space, the failure to provide a unique criterion of identity for those parts does not lead to the problems discussed in section 1.2. On this structural interpretation, it may be difficult to distinguish the different spatial parts and points given the homogenous nature of infinite Euclidean space, but this is an empirical problem far removed from the deeply troubling ontological worries associated with Huggett’s reading of (Aii), where all of the parts/points become numerically the same part/point. On a structural construal, accordingly, it would be incorrect to assert, as does Huggett, that the metrical relations in Newton’s theory are between points, “of their metrical relations to one another” (7), since this implies that the points have an existence prior to, or separate from, the overall metrical structure of space. Returning to (Aii), a structuralist reading thus allows a literal interpretation of Newton’s statement that “the parts of space are individuated by their positions, so that if any two could change their positions, they would change their individuality at the same time and each would be converted numerically into the other.” This form of reasoning, advanced in a number of works by Howard Stein as well (most recently, 2002, 272), exactly parallels contemporary structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics, as Healey remarks in connection with Newton’s immobility arguments:
On this conception, it is its place in a certain relational structure that makes p the spacetime point that it is. In this respect spacetime points are analogous to mathematical objects. It is its position in the natural numbers which makes 3 the number that it is, so it is impossible, even unintelligible, to suppose that the number 3 might have been the seventh natural number. (1995, 303)

In an ironic twist, this “holistic” conception of space that both Healey and Nerlich posit can be best described using the neo-Platonic terminology employed by More and Newton; namely, that space—including the metric (order of position of spatial parts)—is one, simple, and indiscerpible! Although Healey, Nerlich, and Stein, seem unaware of the historical backdrop to the immobility arguments, and they do not provide any historical support for their interpretations, the discussions above do indeed confirm a conception of Newton’s spatial theory that is consistent with a structuralist interpretation of the parts of space. The intent of (Aii), put simply, is to make the mereological case that space is a non-aggregate, partless whole, such that the very individuality of parts derives from the whole. The (Aii) argument, hence, provides a more detailed elaboration for why the motions of the parts of space, critiqued initially in (Ai), is not possible—if they moved out of space, they would no longer exist; and this also explains why there is no talk of the parts moving in (Aii), rather, two parts merely “change their position” with respect to one another. In a passage from TeL, from which a smaller quotation has already been given above, the simple, non-aggregate structure of space is likewise defended:  
But neither does Place argue the divisibility of a thing or the multitude of its parts, and on that account imperfection, since space itself has no parts which can be separated from one another, or be moved among themselves, or be distinguished from one another by any inherent marks. Space is not compounded of aggregated parts since there is no least in it, no small or great or greatest, nor are there more parts in the totality of space than there are in any place which the very least body of all occupies. In each of its points it is like itself and uniform nor does it truly have parts other than mathematical points, that is everywhere infinite in number and nothing in magnitude. For it is a single being, most simple, and most perfect in its kind. To be bounded in time and in place, or to be changeable does argue imperfection, but to be the same always and everywhere is supreme perfection.” (1987b,117)

Among its many disclosures, it is worth drawing specific attention to Newton’s assertion that space only has parts in the sense of “mathematical points, that is everywhere infinite in number and nothing in magnitude”; and, “nor are there more parts in the totality of space than there are in any place which the very least body of all occupies.” In other words, Newton’s conception of the part-whole constitution of space follows, what we may call, the standard Aristotelian-Euclidean view of geometry, wherein a line of any length can be conceptually decomposed into an infinity of points, although the line itself is not actually constructed by a process of adding points (since they have no magnitude). This aspect of Newton’s theory clearly has holistic overtones, but the truly non-reducible character of the spatial metric, and its relationship with (Aii), will only become evident provided further exegesis of the Newtonian corpus.
2.4. The Order of Position of Spatial Parts. Despite its later origins, the Aristotelian geometric inclinations in TeL (early 1690s) can be traced back to some of Newton’s earliest forays into these topics. In the Trinity Notebooks from 1664-1665 (Questiones), there are numerous features in Newton handling of spatial/mathematical hypotheses that are identical with his later work on the metaphysics of space, in particular, De Grav, Principia, and TeL. The similarities can be described, roughly, as pertaining to the individuation of points and the continuity of space, two aspects of Newton’s treatment that are intimately linked to the question of the holistic, or simple, nature of the metric of space; i.e., that the metric of space is not derived from the relationships among its parts.
In the Metaphysics (1984; V.6.1016b24-27), Aristotle provides what may be the determining conceptual distinction that underlies Newton’s (Aii): “that which is indivisible in quantity is called a unit if it is not divisible in any dimension and is without position, a point if it is not divisible in any dimension, and has position.” In short, points are without dimension, but (unlike units/numbers) have a position. As McGuire and Tamny clarify, in the Aristotelian-Euclidean tradition, “The point itself lacks existence independent of the line, but it can be distinguished by its position relative to another point, or with respect to the line itself” (1983, 62). The motivation behind the use of position as a means of identification likely resides in the unique difficulties associated with points and the definition of continuity (on the latter, see, e.g., Physics VI.1.231a21-231b18). Since points are “partless”, points cannot touch without completely overlapping (i.e., they can only touch whole to whole); or, put differently, if two points are in contact they would then possess common extremities—but two things that possess common extremities are continuous and one, since they occupy the same place. This interrelationship between the place and continuity is echoed in Newton’s Questiones: “Extension is related to places, as time to days, years, etc. Place is the principium individuationis of straight lines and of equal and like figures; the surfaces of two bodies becoming but one when they are contiguous, because in but one place” (351). Likewise, “if you say then that [a point] might touch one of the other points that makes the line, I say then that that point is in the same place with the point that it touches . . .” (421). As in (Aii), the geometric elements themselves are individuated via the overall spatial backdrop (places, order of spatial parts), since the peculiar character of geometric elements on the Aristotelian-Euclidean scheme renders them incapable of securing their own individuation (due to the continuity problem). Needless to say, this form of reasoning undermines any attempt to construct the metric of space from the relationships among its parts—indeed, if the parts are actually individuated by the metric, then Nerlich’s claim that the parts supervene on the overall structure of space would appear to be somewhat vindicated.
In response, the critic might argue that Newton’s appeal to place as a means of individuating geometrical elements only commits him to the weaker (topological) notions of coincidence/non-coincidence, and not a metric (order of spatial parts). Newton’s explanation that “extension is related to places, as time to days, years, etc.” would seem to undermine this line of reasoning, nevertheless. Since a day or year is a part of duration in the sense that it has a finite amount of duration, it follows that place is likewise a part of extension in that it possesses a finite degree of extension—hence it is very difficult to tie Newton’s use of “place” to a non-metrical, topological conception. This last inference is, in addition, supported by arguments put forth in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, where space and time are categorized as “quantities, which situation and order [are] not” (2000, 72; C.V.54). He continues: “the distance, interval, or quantity of time or space . . . is entirely a distinct thing from the situation or order and does not constitute any quantity of situation of order; the situation or order may be the same when the quantity of time or space intervening is very different” (73). Situation and order are likened to ratios and proportions, which “are not quantities but the proportion of quantities” (73). Leibniz’ definition of space as the “order of coexistences” (14, L.III.4) is the subject of Clarke’s somewhat misguided criticism (for Leibniz insists that his relational conception includes distance; 50, L.V.54); but, Clarke’s explanation nicely demonstrates that the Newtonian worldview presumes, at the least, the metric (“distance”) as a basic quantitative feature of space—and this, of course, imparts a metrical significance to all of its constitutive parts, whether points, lines, surfaces or volumes (as is consistent with the Aristotelian-Euclidean geometric tradition). The scholium on space and time raises the same issue in a passage we shall label (C):
[(C)] Place is the part of space that a body occupies, and it is, depending on the space, either absolute or relative. I say the part of space, not the situation [situs] of the body or its outer surface. For the places of equal solids are always equal, while their surfaces are for the most part unequal because of the dissimilarity of shapes; and situations, properly speaking, do not have quantity and are not so much places as attributes of places [quam affectiones locorum]. (2004, 65)

As with Clarke’s description, situations “properly speaking” do not have a quantity, unlike space and its associated places. Indeed, situation is an attribute of the quantity place, and hence space, given the oneness of space discussed above. 
McGuire and Tamny interpret this last passage, (C), as a reversal of (Aii), however. The parts of space do not obtain their identity from the order of position (situation), as in (Aii); rather, since positions are the attributes of places, it follows that the places, as the parts of space, are prior to the order of position. They conclude that “this indicates that situations derive their character from the parts of space on which they depend, and not the converse as De gravitatione states” (1983, 73). But, this confuses the order of position per se, namely, as in Clarke’s examples of pure ratios or proportions, which do not have quantity, with the order of position of spatial parts, which does (hence the rationale behind our use of the latter designation throughout this essay): that is, Newton’s immobility arguments always associate order or situation with space; e.g., “the order of the parts of space” in (B), and “the parts of space are individuated by their positions” (Aii). Since Newton specifically mentions “the situation of the body or its outer surface”, it would seem that, like Clarke, his goal in (C) is to criticize the general relationist idea that place is determined by the mutual situations of bodies, as well as the Scholastic/Cartesian idea that place is the boundary of the contained/containing bodies (both aspects being contained in Descartes’ concept of external place; Descartes 1991, 45-46; Principles, II §13-15). Consequently, there is no evidence in (C) to warrant overturning the identity argument (Aii), since the latter applies specifically to space and not body, unlike the former. Moreover, as Rynasiewicz (1995, 141) has noted, Newton’s explanation that “the places of equal solids are always equal, while their surfaces are for the most part unequal because of the dissimilarity of shapes” is a reference to the inherent volume of place (as opposed to the surface area of the body’s boundary or the non-quantity order/situation of bodies), and volume is a metric measure. Thus, when (C) is added to the holistic, simple characterization of space in the De Grav, TeL, etc., above, the basic metrical nature of space, as a quantity with the attribute of order/situation, becomes readily apparent.
Before leaving this section, it would be fruitful to examine a passage from De Grav that demonstrates Newton’s adherence to the Aristotelian-Euclidean conception of the continuity of geometry/space, and which also highlights the relationship between parts and points, a subject that is not often treated in his discussion.
In all directions, space can be distinguished into parts whose common boundaries we usually call surfaces; and these surfaces can be distinguished in all directions into parts whose common boundaries we usually call lines; and again these lines can be distinguished in all directions into parts which we call points. And hence surfaces do not have depth, nor lines breadth, nor points dimension, unless you say that coterminous spaces penetrate each other as far as the depth of the surface between them, namely what I have said to be the boundary of both or the common limit; and the same applies to lines and points. Furthermore, spaces are everywhere contiguous to spaces, and extension is everywhere placed next to extension, and so there are everywhere common boundaries of contiguous parts; . . . . (2004, 22)

This analysis nicely relates both the geometrical nature of Newton’s ontology of space, as well as its composition: points, lines, surfaces, and thus volumes, are all elements of Newton’s one, simple, and indiscerpible space (much as TeL also described space’s parts as “mathematical points”). That is, although (C) does not refer to points and other geometrical elements, it would be a mistake to single out only place or volume as the key components in Newton’s spatial ontology. Belkind (2007) attempts to make a case for volume as central to Newton’s defense of absolute space, based largely on the scholium on space and time, and employing Newton’s anti-relationist argument that “whole and absolute motions can be determined only by means of unmoving places, . . .” (2004, 67). Yet, as we have seen, non-dimensionless points are held to be as much a part of space as place (volume), since points are distinguished by the metric, as in the Questiones extract (421) above. Despite the fact that Newton’s examples utilize moving bodies, which have volume, the appeal to the compound motions of the constitutive parts of bodies could have employed bodily points as easily as bodily volumes to attack Descartes, along with using the points of absolute space to determine absolute motions (as opposed to relative motions).​[3]​        
2.5. Least distance. The inference that space has an essential metric structure is corroborated elsewhere in the Trinity notebook, where Newton explores, and ultimately rejects, the possibility that spatial lengths may be comprised, bottom up, from a least unit of distance linked to the topology of its constitutive mathematical points. The main goal of these investigations seems to be the Epicurean atomist idea that there exists a minimal indivisible quantity of matter, such that the minimal distances become “the basis of all other extensions and the mould of atoms” (423). Newton employs a cipher method of marking off the points on a line, with the stipulation that the ciphers “resist being the same” (421), that is, they retain a power of non-coincidence (cf. Huggett 2008, 8). The collection of ciphers thereby represents the units of least distances among the points, partes extra partes, along the line. Given a point, if “there be another point with which it refuses to be joined, . . . then there is distance between the two, though indivisible, and the least that can be, . . .” (423). Newton’s assumption that these least distances are indivisible nevertheless runs into the obvious difficulty that, at least conceptually, “the least extension is infinitely larger than a point and therefore can contain it and be divided by it” (425). This prompts the reply, “I confess it is so”, along with an abortive effort to insist that, although a least distances “has no inside, no midst, nor center”, it therefore must be the case that the infinite number of points in that least extension “must be all in the borders or sides and outward superficies of it, and that cannot make out a place for division” (425). For our purposes, the important development is that Newton crossed out these notebook pages, i.e., the pages that elaborate his least distance thought experiment, likely due to the untenability of his defense of their indivisibility. Thereafter, Newton would favor a material atomism that is merely physically indivisible, and thereby obviate the requirement for a least distance commensurate with a conceptually indivisible unit of matter (see, McGuire and Tamny 1983, 60-91, for an extended analysis).
Another difficulty with Newton’s least distance hypothesis, which may have contributed to its abrupt demise, is the inevitable implication that there must exist a direct correlation between the length of a line (figure) and the number of its, probably finite, constitutive points. Central to Newton’s hypothesis, of course, is the notion that the points “are imbued with such a power as that they could not touch or be in one place . . .”, which leads to the following conclusion: “add these [points] as close in a line as they can stand together. Every point added must make some extension to the length, because it cannot sink into the former’s place or touch it” (343, emphasis added). This inference not only contradicts other sections of the notebooks (e.g., “points added between points infinitely are equivalent to a finite line”; 345), but it is clearly alien to the Aristotelian-Euclidean direction that Newton’s mathematical thought would increasingly take after 1664-1665. Recalling Newton claims, in TeL, that “space is not compounded of aggregated parts”, and his denial that there are “more parts in the totality of space than there are in any place”, the metric of space would thus seem to have acquired a simple, holistic quality fairly early, since his non-simple, non-holistic conception of an atomic least distance is absent from all later works subsequent to these (deleted) pages from the Trinity notebook.​[4]​ It is for these reasons that Newton’s utilization of the order of position/situation of spatial parts, in (Aii) and (B), is similarly imbued with a metrical significance: that is, given the failure to construct the metric from a topology of points (which possess a primitive power of “non-conjunction”), and since the geometrical elements are individuated by a metrically-influenced concept (e.g., the Questiones, 351). 
Lastly, based on their analysis of the cipher construction in the Questiones, McGuire and Tamny offer a prescient observation with respect to the De Grav’s (Aii) which can be seen as the forerunner to the difficulties later developed by Nerlich and Huggett. They observe that “positions are positions of parts, and they depend for their character on the parts themselves”, rather than on the points of the earlier cipher method. But, the infinity of space necessitates that “one position, any one, be nameable independent of the others”, which “cannot be done” (1983, 72). As with the later commentators, however, McGuire and Tamny err by overlooking the simplicity and oneness of space: to claim that the positions of parts “depend for their character on the parts themselves” is tantamount to asking for a criterion of the individuality of the parts independent of the whole, which raises a host of problems for Newton’s other non-reductive, holistic pronouncements on the parts of space (as discussed above)—e.g., “nor are there more parts in the totality of space than there are in any place which the very least body of all occupies” (1987b,117). How does one make sense of this passage on McGuire and Tamny’s suggestion? On the other hand, they construe these difficulties “from an epistemic perspective” (72), which marks a notable improvement over the much more ontologically tinged allegations submitted by both Nerlich and Huggett. 
Part of the motivation for McGuire and Tamny’s criticism of (Aii) may lie in their assertion that one of the features that may have survived Newton’s abandonment of the least distance hypothesis, at least in some form, is the cipher method of demarcating the units of distance, i.e., a metric: “every cipher . . . being different or distant from all the former by the quantity of a unit” (423). While it may be true that the cipher method is analogous with Newton’s later discussion of the spatial order of position in the De Grav and later works, the generality of the concept of a metric order hardly requires the earlier precedent, although the relational structure of the arrayed ciphers does bear a vague resemblance with the identity argument in (Aii). That is, given a collection of 11 ciphers, demarcating 10 units of distance, the collected ciphers represent a non-aggregate, simple metrical structure such that one cannot add another cipher “into the midst of them, as between [ciphers] five and six” (423). Yet, unlike (Aii), the relational structure of the ciphers is generated from “a nature and quality that they will resist being the same”—in other words, each cipher retains enough individuality that it can resist being identical to another cipher, and from these individual “powers” the metric is constructed. (Aii) stipulates, in contrast, that the individuality of spatial parts is determined by the metric (order of position of spatial parts) alone, with no hint of any individual traits apart from, or prior to, the metric of the whole (simple, one, indiscerpible) space.   

3. Contemporary Spacetime Debates and the Immobility Arguments.
Not surprisingly, there are a number of contrasting interpretations of the relevance of Newton’s immobility arguments for modern spacetime theories, especially substantivalism and structural realism. In what follows, we will examine some of the more prominent studies that are pertinent to the foregoing historical analysis.
3.1. Transformations? Returning to the De Grav version of the immobility arguments, Torretti has proposed that (Aii) can be interpreted as providing a criterion of the identity of points “but only up to isomorphism” (1999, 55; where “isomorphism” is defined as “a structure-preserving one-to-one mappings” of the points of space): 
Newtonian—that is, Euclidean—space admits an infinity of distinct internal isomorphisms . . . . In particular, if we designate one of these copies be E and we represent by the vector v a translation of each point of E in the direction of v by a distance equal to v’s length, then, if the parameter t ranges over the real numbers, the translation tv yield the successive positions of a frame Ev Moving through E with a constant velocity v” (56). 

Torretti draws the conclusion that, based on this reading of (Aii), “all inertial frames are equivalent” (56), and hints that this Newton-inspired approach can also help to resolve Einstein’s “hole” argument: i.e., the hole argument “forgets the fact, so clearly set forth by Newton, that points in a structured manifold have no individuality apart from their structural relations” (297). Nerlich (2005, 129) rightly criticizes Torretti’s analysis as inconsistent with the last sentence of (B), which posits motionless absolute places, such that “changes of position from these places . . . are absolute motions”. To be specific, while Newton’s Principia draws a distinction between absolute and relative space (with the latter being inertially related copies of absolute space), the true rest frame of the material world is absolute space, and thus not all inertial frames are ontologically equivalent (see also section 3.2 below). 
Yet, it is more instructive to examine Torretti’s reading against the backdrop of the De Grav’s immobility arguments, since (Aii) informs his structuralist appraisal, as opposed to (B). While not a mathematical mapping or transformation of the parts of space per se, (Ai) does offer two reasons for rejecting the idea that the parts of space can move. First, he insists that it cannot be “a translation from the vicinity of other contiguous parts, as Descartes defined the motion of bodies” since “it has been sufficiently demonstrated that this is absurd”. In a preceding section of the De Grav, Newton offers a number of arguments against Descartes’ (Aristotelian) conception of external place, as the boundary of the contained and containing body, and its corresponding definition of motion as change of place (Descartes 1991, 51; Principles, II §25). Newton argues that “after the completion of some motion the position of the surrounding bodies no longer stays the same as it was before” (2004, 19), since the boundary no longer exists, and since Descartes’ plenum also dictates that the place of a moved body is filled-in by other bodies.  
Now since it is impossible to pick out the place in which a motion began, . . . for this place no longer exists after the motion is completed, that traversed space, having no beginning, can have no length; and since velocity depends upon the length of the space passed over in a given time, it follows that the moving body can have no velocity . . . . (20)

Translated into Torretti’s terminology, the demise of the original place of the body entails that there can be no determination of v (and t, for that matter) in the isomorphism Ev. Newton’s reasoning deserves careful scrutiny, moreover, for it raises a number of intriguing questions as regards his ontological conception of space. Does Newton believe that, like Descartes, the removal of a part of space/extension would bring about a reshuffling of the remaining parts of space/extension, presumably because there can be no non-extended vacuum? (That is, Descartes holds that there is only a conceptual distinction between matter and extension, and if the matter were removed from the inside of a vessel, its sides would conjoin; Principles, II §11-18: Does Newton accept a similar outcome?) At the least, Newton’s claim that the motion of a part would be “a translation from the vicinity of other contiguous parts” suggests that he is using a plenum model to depict the motion of the parts in space, as opposed to out of space. 
This last point is evident in the second (Ai) criticism of the idea that spatial parts can move: “or . . . it is translation out of space into space, that is out of itself, unless perhaps it is said that two spaces everywhere coincide, a moving one and a motionless one”. We have already examined, in section 2.2, the basis for this alleged contradiction in claiming that space can move “out of itself”, namely, using Clarke’s explanation, that it is “to suppose it parted and yet not parted”. The second half of this sentence, however, is of particular interest, and not simply due to its relative obscurity. The phrase “unless perhaps it is said” apparently signifies that it is an exception to the idea that the part moves “out of space into space”, and this is consistent with the remainder of the sentence: that is, Newton imagines that the so-called “moving” part does not actually leave its space, but merely occupies two spaces simultaneously, the original motionless space and a moving space that “everywhere coincides” with it. If this interpretation is correct, then this brief aside likely constitutes the closest approximation to a geometric transformation concept in Newton’s spatial theorizing. Yet, the type of transformation envisaged is not an active transformation, “a one-one mapping of spacetime onto itself” (Torretti 1999, 263; which he labels a “point transformation”), since this implies a mapping “out of space into space” which Newton rejects. Nerlich also finds Torretti’s exegeses a violation of the “out of space into space” prohibition (128), but Nerlich fails to take the transformation analogy a bit further. The mapping that best correlates with Newton’s (Ai) explanation would more likely fall under a passive (or coordinate) transformation, where the geometric objects remain fixed under a substitution of coordinates—in the (Ai) case, it would be a transformation of a coordinate frame x at a point p, to a another coordinate frame y also at p, where y is related to x by a velocity boost v, rather than as an active mapping h from p to its image under the mapping, hp (see, e.g., Friedman 1983, 51-53, in addition to Torretti, 263-264). Consequently, if the resolution of Einstein’s hole argument necessitates an active (point) transformation, as Torretti maintains (297), then his citing Newton’s (Ai) as an historical precedent falls wide of the mark.​[5]​
3.2. “Leibniz Shifts” and the Underlying Ontology of Space. As previously mentioned, Huggett strives to avoid the implications of the identity argument, (Aii), by developing a representational account of point: “if two points in different worlds or states have the same metrical relations to other points then they represent the same points” (2008, 11). Yet, given the homogeneity of Newton’s Euclidean space, it therefore follows that the material world cannot differ as regards its position in absolute space (static shift), and hence nor can the material world be in motion in absolute space (kinematic shift):
Consider two states in which the geometry is Euclidean . . . , so that every point in one world is metrically indistinguishable from every point in the other. Since representation de re supervenes on the metrical relations between points, one state cannot unequivocally represent any point as standing in any different relation to bodies from the other. But bodies can only move with respect to space—i.e., absolutely—if they can occupy different parts of space at different times; and that is impossible if matter isn’t represented as occupying different parts of space in the possible states in the world. (2008, 14)

R. DiSalle accepts these consequences of (Aii), claiming that Newton “is expressly denying that the points of space . . . are ‘irreducible objects of first order predication’ (cf. Earman (1989)) and therefore denying by implication that the material universe would be intrinsically different if it existed at different spatial and temporal points” (1994, 267). But, as Huggett correctly points out, Clarke admits that Leibniz shifts are distinct, possible states of the world (C.V.1-20), a stance that Newton apparently found unobjectionable in his review of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence for Des Maizeaux (see, Koyré and Cohen 1962). Indeed, one of the main goals of the scholium is to demonstrate that “absolute and relative rest and motion are distinguished from each other” (2004, 66). It is thus not surprising that Huggett finds the demise of Leibniz shifts to be a major obstacle for his de re representation account, although he does not construe this development, as perhaps he should, as a reductio of his interpretation.
To briefly return to the several topics from section 3.2, it is important to bear in mind that Newton provides a fairly body-centered definition of absolute and relative place/space in the scholium: “relative space is any movable measure or dimension of . . . absolute space; such a measure or dimension is determined by our senses from the situation (situm) of the space with respect to bodies and is popularly used for immovable space, . . .” (2004, 64). This type of description could be seen as upholding a form of active transformation, and it would naturally align with Corollary 5 of the Principia as well, i.e., the principle of Galilean relativity (see also endnote 3). Nevertheless, it is not a transformation of the sort as expressed in passage (Aii) from the De Grav, where the transformation only involves the parts of space and are conceived metaphysically or conceptually (and which more accurately resembles a passive transformation anyway). Rather, since the Principia’s Galilean transformations are defined, so to speak, materially or “operationally” (using bodies),​[6]​ it follows that these active transformations operate at the purely phenomenal level, such that one, and only one, of the potentially infinite set of the transformations corresponds to Newton’s immobile absolute place/space. And, despite Newton’s valiant efforts to distinguish absolute and relative space by way of absolute motion and its effects, the scholium’s thought experiments that are intended to determine the absolute motion of bodies (i.e., the rotating bucket and rotating globes) are incapable of breaking the symmetry of the Galilean transformations to reveal the true rest state of space (i.e., absolute space). The reading that both Torretti and DiSalle favor, consequently, just does not capture the intended meaning of Newton’s (Aii), which concerns the metaphysics of the parts of space, and not the symmetries of material inertial systems. 
All told, Huggett’s formulation of the Leibniz shift problem still relies heavily on a conception of “the metrical relations between points” (14). In contrast, the holism of the Healey/Nerlich view is that the points supervene on the (metric) structure of space as a whole—and thus, along with the points, the position or motion of the material world can be determined relative to whole of space as well, thus eliminating the underdetermination worries. To recall Healey’s natural numbers analogy, every point in space (point manifold) has a distinct structural role position, just as the number “3” does in the natural numbers; so, the position of the material world can be fixed relative to this framework. The infinity of space need not be regarded as a major problem for this hypothesis, moreover, since the De Grav asserts that “we can understand” the infinity of space, such that this conception is “maximally positive” (2004, 23-24).​[7]​ Analogously, the infinity of the natural numbers are does not undermine the structural role played by the number “3”, and, similarly, the infinity of space does not undercut the structural role position of any point in a holistically-conceived account of space.   
Yet, leaving aside this reason for rejecting Huggett’s Leibniz shift problem, there is another basis upon which to gauge the positions and motions of the material world, a central feature of Newton’s spatial ontology that cropped up frequently in our analysis in section 2. In short, Newton maintains that the ontological foundation of space is an infinite God, and thus there is a very unique irreducible “object” (of first order predication) that grounds the existence of space, as well as its immobility and infinity (as is the case with Henry More and the other Cambridge neo-Platonists; see section 2 and endnote 1). There are abundant passages in Newton’s corpus from which to choose, for example: De Grav, “space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (26); General Scholium, Principia (1713), “He [God] endures forever, and is everywhere present; and by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes (constituit) duration and space” (2004, 91). This last conjecture, that God “constitutes” space, would hence seem to rule out the possibility that any motion, or point transformation, is applicable to this entity (against Khamara 2006, 111-112). 
This ontological component of Newton’s theory raises a tricky question: Does the utilization of an infinite, immovable being as the ontological basis of an infinite, immobile space thereby undermine the reason for putting forward (Aii), since God could now be claimed to guarantee the identity of parts of space, and not their “mutual order”? First of all, (Aii) only concerns space, and not God’s role, which is an additional stipulation or feature of his ontology not treated in (Aii). More importantly, the oneness, simplicity, and indiscerpibility of space are the (emanative) effect of a one, simple, indiscerpible God, as the many passages cited in section 2 disclose. In the De Grav, for example, Newton replies to the worry that God is physically divisible by pointing out that space is not physically divisible either (2004, 26). Accordingly, there is abundant evidence to support the conclusion that the holistic nature of space is the consequence of a holistic God—and this may support the further contention that the lack of a primitive identity for the parts of space may be matched by an analogous lack of primitive identity for the parts of God (but this is admittedly a difficult inference to make). Overall, the details of the theological underpinning of Newton’s spatial metaphysics raises numerous interpretive difficulties, but, since the immobility arguments only concern space, the uncertainties are much less problematic for his overall theory.          
3.3. Newtonian Lessons for Spacetime Structuralists. By way of conclusion, it would be useful to compare Newton’s view on space, both in their ontological and structural aspects, with contemporary debates in the philosophy of spacetime theories. Overall, a plausible case can be made that many of the current “sophisticated” crop of interpretations, whether substantivalist, relationist, or structural realist, are generally consistent with the broad outlines of Newton’s conception. These approaches follow Newton’s holistic lead by emphasizing the crucial role of the metric (“order of position of spatial parts”) in determining or characterizing the point manifold (i.e., without requiring the primitive identity of points in the manner of manifold substantivalism), and by placing both structures on at least an even ontological footing; e.g., Dorato 2000, Esfeld and Lam 2008, to name but a mere few. 
Nevertheless, despite the structural role identity that Newton ascribes to the parts of space, the Platonism that underlies Newton’s commitment to all of the elements of spatial geometry, both topologically and metrically, would likely conflict with the rationale behind some modern attempts to demote the reality of the point manifold in favor of metric structure; e.g., Hoefer 1996, and possibly, Stachel 2002. Hoefer’s metric field substantivalism aims “to strip primitive identity from space-time points”, such that “the focus of this view is on the metric tensor as the real representor of space-time . . .” (Hoefer 1996, 24). Newton’s Aristotelian-Euclidean geometric inclinations, on the other hand, would not warrant this form of skepticism about the reality of spatial points: the metric may determine the location, and thus identity, of points, but it does not undercut their rightful role as part of “the real representor” of space. Newton, as we have seen, assigns an equal degree of reality to both the metric and points, since “space can be distinguished  . . . in all directions into parts which we call points. (2004, 22)”. In fact, the structure of physical space is practically equated with (Euclidean) geometry, as the last quote’s ensuing discussion reveals:  
For the delineation of any material figure is not a new production of that figure with respect to space, but only a corporeal representation of it, so that what was formerly insensible in space now appears before the senses. . . . We firmly believe that the space was spherical before the sphere occupied it, so that it could contain the sphere; and hence as there are everywhere spaces that can adequately contain any material sphere, it is clear that space is everywhere spherical. And so of other figures. (22)

This mathematical conception of space, which is not metaphorical but literal, has not been sufficiently stressed in the literature—it is, in particular, consistent with an (ontic?) structuralist approach to spatial geometry that draws inspiration from a realism about mathematical structures in general, whether Platonist or of a milder variety (see Slowik 2005, for more details on this spacetime structural realist strategy). If one were to venture a classification that fits the particulars of Newton’s overall ontology of space, which includes its foundational role for an omnipresent being, an in re geometric structural realism would seem to best capture his intentions, since the oneness of space is predicated on the oneness of God (see, section 3.2, and, Shapiro 1997, on the varieties of mathematical structuralism).​[8]​ Unlike the contemporary spacetime scene, though, Newton’s realism about spatial geometry benefits from the absence of an underdetermination of alternative geometric formalisms (tensors on manifolds, twistors, Einstein algebras, etc.) or alternative physical constructions (a la Poincaré), since Euclidean geometry was the only available option in the seventeenth century.
Furthermore, a major factor that separates Newton’s Aristotelian-Euclidean geometric outlook from the concerns of modern spacetime ontologists is that the latter are motivated by the underdetermination dilemma imposed by the hole argument, especially the modern variant formulated by Earman and Norton (1987), and, in general, by the isomorphisms of spacetime structure that are an essential part of modern mathematical formulations. In contrast, the mathematical structures used to characterize the point manifold in these theories, such as Einstein algebras, would likely be judged by Newton as either additional spatial structures or simply useful mathematical techniques, but not as a definition for what it means to be a spatial point. As explained above, the De Grav’s (Aii) is not a seventeenth century analogue of a transformation argument, and thus the delineation of geometric structures (metric, manifold, affine, etc.) that such techniques can assist in disclosing is simply not a part of Newton’s holistic geometric realism.     
Finally, to return to a thread that connects much in our analysis, the immobile entity (God) that supplies the foundation of Newton’s immobile space needs to be taken into account when adjudicating among modern spacetime counterparts of his theory.​[9]​ Like the Ancient’s attachment to constant circular celestial motion, Newton’s God-grounded ontology of space elucidates its infinite, unchanging nature. In the passage from TeL quoted in section 2.2, which refers to space, but could equally describe his theology, he states: “to be changeable does argue imperfection, but to be the same always and everywhere is supreme perfection” (1987b, 117). As regards this issue, there is thus an important sense in which Maudlin’s “metric essentialism”—that the “parts of space bear their metrical relations essentially” (1988, 86; put forward, incidentally, against the backdrop of (Aii))—is much closer in spirit to Newton’s Euclidean realism than the many sophisticated ontologies, listed above, that rely on a class of Leibniz equivalent models (by way of diffeomorphisms) to characterize the reality of the point manifold. The essential metrical qualities of the parts and points of Newton’s space are secured by the oneness of space, of course, in a top-down fashion, as opposed to the possibly bottoms-up (from points to the whole of space) orientation of Maudlin’s original idea. Nevertheless, the metric properties of Newton’s space can never change, a realization that likewise undermines the alternative, dynamic scenarios of his spatial metric envisaged by both Nerlich (131) and Huggett (12).
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^1	  See, Grant 1981, for an extended treatment of the Aristotelian/Scholastic theories of space that influenced the seventeenth century development. On Newton’s indebtedness to his predecessors, whether More and the other neo-Platonists or other schools of thought, see, e.g., Hall 2002, and McGuire 1978a, and Slowik 2008a. Newton’s Trinity notebook, the Questiones (1664-1665), discussed below, contains evidence that he had read both Charleton’s Physiologia (1654) and More’s The Immortality of the Soul (1997), but he must have been thoroughly familiar with More’s Enchiridium (1995), as well. Finally, the influence of Barrow and Wallis would seem to have helped shape Newton’s move towards the Aristotelian-Euclidean conception of geometry; see, McGuire and Tamny 1983, 54-57, 94-97. 
^2	  As Koyré and Cohen point out (1962, 91), most modern translations incorrectly use the term “indiscernible” in place of “indiscerpible”, the latter being the term used in Clarke’s original reply.
^3	  There are several other problem with Belkind’s analysis, moreover. That a Cartesian body’s quantity of motion is joined with its volume, or internal place (actually, the volume of its second and third elements; see, Slowik 1996) is not undermined by the fact that the constitutive parts of that body may have their own motions, and thus their own quantities of motion linked to their own volumes. This is no more a problem for Descartes than for Newton, whose Corollary 5 (i.e., the principle of Galilean relativity) fatally weakens the case for an absolute/relative divide as regards inertial motions anyhow. Newton’s ship example, ironically, is Descartes’ own part-whole illustration: “on a ship, all motions are the same with respect to one another whether the ship is at rest or is moving uniformly straight forward” (Newton 2004, 78; Descartes, Principles, II §13). Indeed, if Belkind’s suggestion that the scholium’s part-whole critique (above) is devised “to support the concept of momentum” (288), as opposed to a mere metaphysical criticism of Cartesian thought, then Corollary 5 would undermine Newton’s own mechanics (since the true motion of the ship would need to be determined in order to calculate the momentum of any interactions on the ship)! Contrary to Belkind’s estimate (290), furthermore, the rotating bucket and globes examples in the scholium are best viewed as inferences (to the best explanation)  of the reality of absolute space, since the non-inertial effects of rotation are not correlated with the relative motions of the bodies, contra relationism (and this is the only legitimate case that Newton can make).            
^4	  McGuire (1982) and Koslow (1976, 254) attempt to make a case for a least spatial unit in Newton’s post-Questiones natural philosophy, or that Newton’s spatial ontology at least does not countenance dimensionless points. But, the passage quoted from TeL above (1987b, 117) utterly refutes these readings (and McGuire, in fact, rejects the least distance interpretation in an endnote added later, 185).   
^5	  Then again, if the hole argument is conceived as employing a passive (coordinate) transformation, rather than an active (point) transformation, than maybe Newton’s (Ai) could be seen as foreshadowing a resolution of the problem. That is, the type of underdeterminism that plagues the hole scenarios could then be viewed as the result of different coordinate frame constructions of the same state-of-affairs (passive), as opposed to different states-of-affairs (or possible worlds) viewed within the same coordinate frame (active). Overall, a passive construal would thus seem to render the underdeterminism as merely alternative representations of the same reality, whereas the active reading describes a genuine physical underdeterminism—and the former is much less troubling than the latter.        
^6	  For example: “place is the part of space that a body occupies” (65); and “we define all places on the basis of the positions and distances of things from some body that we regard as immovable, and then we reckon all motions with respect to these places” (66). He adds that “absolute motions can be determined only by means of unmoving places, . . . and relative motions to movable places” (67). As for absolute place/space: “the only places that are unmoving are those that all keep give positions in relation to one another from infinity to infinity . . .” (67).   
^7	  We cannot imagine the infinity of space, however, due to the limitations of the cognitive faculty of imagination (24). In contrast, Descartes’ view of extension, as “indefinite” (Principles, I §26), would likely pose a problem for a holistic idea, given the incomplete or uncertain connotations implicit in this description. 
^8	  In Hoefer’s terms, Newton’s Aristotelian-Euclidean holistic conception of geometry would likely translate into a “metric plus point manifold” substantivalism—but, see, Slowik 2008b, which argues that Newton’s ontology of space is best categorized as a property theory, albeit with various qualifications, and not substantivalism.
^9	  However, if one were to use the strategies surveyed in Wüthrich (2008) for resolving the problem of the identity argument (as we have labeled it), then the foundational role that an omnipresent being assumes in Newton’s theory does raise a number of intriguing possibilities. In essence, this type of being, which is infinite and non-limited by definition, could naturally provide Newton with the basis for the numerical plurality of points, or for securing an irreflexive, “weak discernibility” function on points (Saunders 2006) without therefore having to assume more than one point. As regards modern, non-theological spacetime equivalents, a good candidate for an underlying ontology that could bring about or “constitute” space (see section 3.2), and whose numerical plurality could dissolve the (Aii) difficulty, might be found in some of the latest quantum gravity hypotheses, such as string theory or loop quantum gravity (assuming they are sufficiently background independent; see, e.g., Rickles and French 2006).    
